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Abstract
We identify a whole family of approval-based multi-winner voting
rules that satisfy PJR. Moreover, we identify a subfamily of voting
rules within this family that satisfy EJR. All these voting rules can
be computed in polynomial time as long as the subalgorithms that
characterize each rule within the family are polynomial. One of the
voting rules that satisfy EJR can be computed in O(nmk).
1 Introduction
The use of axioms in social choice theory dates back to the works of Ar-
row [11]. When the goal of the election is to select two or more candidates
(i.e. a committee), one importat type of axioms are those that try to identify
which requirements must comply a representative set of winners.
In the context of approval-based multi-winner elections this topic has
been adressed by Aziz et al. in [1] (the journal paper version is [2]). They
proposed two axioms to capture the idea of representation: justified repre-
sentation (JR) and extended justified representation (EJR). JR establishes
requirements on when a set of voters deserves a representative while EJR
establishes requirements on when a set of voters deserves several represen-
tatives. Aziz et al. analysed with these axioms several well known multi-
winner voting rules. The only voting rule that they found that satisfies EJR
is the Proportional Approval Voting (PAV). Unfortunately, Aziz et al. [3]
and Skowron et al. [10] have proved that computing PAV is NP-complete.
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No voting rule computable in polynomial time that satisfies EJR has been
found so far.
Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. proposed in [8] a relaxation of EJR that they
called proportional justified representation (PJR). They show that the Greedy
Monroe rule (which can be computed in polynomial time) satisfies PJR if the
target committee size divides the total number of votes. Very soon, Brill et
al. [4] and Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [9] identified two voting rules that satisfy
PJR in all cases and can be computed in polynomial time.
In this paper we identify a whole family of approval-based multi-winner
voting rules that satisfy PJR. Moreover, we identify a subfamily of voting
rules within this family that satisfy EJR. All these voting rules can be com-
puted in polynomial time as long as the subalgorithms that characterize each
rule within the family are polynomial.
2 Notation and preliminaries
We consider an approval-based multi-winner election with a set of voters
N = {1, . . . , n} and a set of candidates C = {c1, . . . , cm}. Each voter i ∈ N
submits an approval ballot Ai ⊆ C, which represents the subset of candidates
that she approves of. We refer to the list A = (A1, . . . , An) of approval
ballots as the ballot profile. We will consider approval-based multi-winner
voting rules that take as input (N,C,A, k), where k is a positive integer that
satisfies k ≤ |C|, and return a subset W ⊆ C of size k, which we call the
winning set. We omit N and C from the notation when they are clear from
the context. We say that the exact quota q is equal to n/k.
For each candidate c ∈ C we refer to Nc as the set of voters that approve
c (Nc = {i ∈ N : c ∈ Ai}) and to nc as the number of voters that approve c
(nc = |Nc|).
The maximum of a finite and non-empty set A of real numbers (repre-
sented as maxA) is the element of A strictly greater than all other elements
of A (we assume that sets cannot contain duplicates). By convention we say
that max ∅ = 0.
Definition 1. Extended/proportional justified representation Con-
sider a ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set C and a target
committee size k, k ≤ |C|. Given a positive integer ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we say
that a set of voters N∗ ⊆ N is ℓ-cohesive if |N∗| ≥ ℓn
k
and |
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai| ≥ ℓ. we
say that a set of candidatesW , |W | = k, provides extended justified represen-
tation (EJR) (respectively, proportional justified representation (PJR)) for
(A, k) if for every ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k} and every ℓ-cohesive set of voters N∗ ⊆ N
it holds that exists a voter i in N∗ such that |Ai ∩ W | ≥ ℓ (respectively,
2
|W ∩ (
⋃
i∈N∗ Ai)| ≥ ℓ). We say that an approval-based voting rule satisfies
extended justified representation (EJR) (respectively, proportional justified
representation (PJR)) if for every ballot profile A and every target commit-
tee size k it outputs a committee that provides EJR (respectively, PJR) for
(A, k).
3 Intuition
Aziz et al. [2] proposed a rule, that they called HareAV, that can be seen as an
extension of the largest remainders apportionment method (with Hare quota)
to approval-based multi-winner elections. HareAV is an iterative method in
which at each step the most approved candidate that has not yet been elected
is added to the set of winners, and at most ⌈n
k
⌉ of the votes that approve the
elected candidate are also removed from the election (when the number of
votes that approve the candidate is less than or equal to ⌈n
k
⌉ all such votes
are removed from the election). Which particular votes are removed is left
open.
Aziz et al. dicuss in [2] whether HareAV satisfies EJR or not. They show
an example in which HareAV fails EJR for some way of breaking intermediate
ties. However, they were unable to construct an example where HareAV fails
EJR for all ways of breaking intermediate ties. Based on this they say: “we
now conjecture that it is always possible to break intermediate ties in HareAV
so as to satisfy EJR”. Unfortunately, there are elections for which HareAV
fails EJR regardless of the tie-breaking rule, as the following example, taken
from Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [8] shows:
Example 1. Let n = 10, k = 7, C = {c1, . . . , c8}. Suppose that Ai = {ci}
for i = 1, . . . , 4 and Ai = {c5, c6, c7, c8} for i = 5, . . . , 10. Let ℓ = 4. Then
ℓ · n
k
= 40
7
< 6, so the set of voters {5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10} form a 4-cohesive group
of voters. However, under HareAV only three candidates from {c5, c6, c7, c8}
will be selected, regardless of the tie-breaking rule used.
Despite this negative result, the underlying idea of removing part of the
votes in successive iterations offers great flexibility: many different ways of
choosing which votes are removed at each iteration can be conceived. Based
on this, we decided to explore the possibility of tweaking HareAV in pursuit
of a rule that satisfies EJR and can be computed in polynomial time.
3.1 First ideas
The set of winners selected by HareAV in the above example fails to provide
EJR because at each iteration too many votes are removed. In this example
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⌈n
k
⌉ = ⌈10
7
⌉ = 2. Therefore, after 3 iterations, there are 6 − 3 ∗ 2 = 0 votes
left that approve {c5, c6, c7, c8}. If instead we remove exactly
10
7
votes at each
iteration, after 3 iterations there would be 6 − 3 ∗ 10
7
= 12/7 votes left that
approve {c5, c6, c7, c8}. This is more than the number of votes received by
any of the other candidates. Therefore, if we remove 10
7
at each iteration, all
the candidates in {c5, c6, c7, c8} would be elected. The problem, of course, is
that 10
7
is not an integer. To solve this we will allow to remove a fraction of
one vote. For each voter i we define f ji as the fraction of the vote of voter
i that has not been removed from the election after j candidates have been
added to the set of winners. For each voter i we define f 0i = 1. At all time,
it must be 0 ≤ f ji ≤ 1.
One advantage of removing fractions of votes instead of whole votes is that
it allows to treat all the votes that approve the elected candidate evenly: we
do not need to ask ourselves which votes must be removed and which ones
must not. We can, for instance, scale down all the fractions of the votes that
approve the elected candidate by the same factor, so the remaining number
of votes is reduced by q = n
k
units. In fact, this rule is not new. According
to Svante Janson [6], it was proposed by the Swedish mathematicians Lars
Edvard Phragme´n and/or Gustaf Enestro¨m in the 19th century (it seems
that the original authorship is not absolutely clear). We will refer to this
rule as phragme´n-STV. phragme´n-STV is formally defined in algorithm 1.
Unfortunately, this rule does not satisfy EJR. Here is one example in
which this rule fails EJR:
Example 2. Let n/k = 120, k = 18, C = {c1, . . . , c21}. Voters cast the
following votes:
• 120 voters approve {c1, c2, c5}
• 120 voters approve {c1, c2, c6}
• 122 voters approve {c5, c7}
• 70 voters approve {c3, c4, c6}
• 50 voters approve {c3, c4}
• 120 voters approve {c3, c4, c8}
• 121 voters approve {c8, c9}
• 52 voters approve {c7}
• 65 voters approve {c9}
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Algorithm 1 phragme´n-STV
Input: an approval-based multi-winner election (N,C,A, k)
Output: the set of winners W
1: q ← n
k
2: W ← ∅
3: for j = 1 to k do
4: foreach c ∈ C \W do
5: sjc ←
∑
i:c∈Ai
f j−1i
6: end foreach
7: w ← argmax
c∈C\W
sjc
8: W ←W ∪ {w}
9: foreach i ∈ N \Nw do
10: f ji ← f
j−1
i
11: end foreach
12: foreach i ∈ Nw do
13: if sjw ≤ q then
14: f ji ← 0
15: else
16: f ji ← f
j−1
i
s
j
w−q
s
j
w
17: end if
18: end foreach
19: end for
20: return W
• For i = 1, . . . , 12, 110 voters approve {c9+i}.
For this example the set of winners selected by phragme´n-STV is one of
c3 or c4 plus {c5, ..., c21}. However, the 240 voters that approve {c1, c2, c5} or
{c1, c2, c6} form a 2-cohesive group of voters but none of these voters approves
2 of the winners.
In the next section we will examine this example in detail to understand
how to tweak further HareAV to make it satisfy EJR. Observe, however, that
it is very easy to prove that phragme´n-STV satisfies PJR. Suppose that N∗
is an ℓ-cohesive group of voters (that is, |N∗| ≥ ℓn
k
and | ∩i∈N∗ Ai| ≥ ℓ).
At each iteration in which a candidate that is approved by some voters in
N∗ is elected at most q = n
k
votes from N∗ are removed. So, after ℓ − 1
candidates that are approved by some voters in N∗ have been selected, at
least ℓn
k
−(ℓ−1)n
k
= n
k
votes from N∗ remain in the election, and there exists
at least one candidate that is approved by all such votes. But it is impossible
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that after all the k candidates have been selected a group of n
k
votes that
approve a common candidate still remains in the election, so we know that
at least one more candidate approved by some voter in N∗ must be elected.
In fact, as long as we remove at most q = n
k
votes at each iteration (and
when the number of remaining votes that approve the selected candidate is
less than or equal to q all such votes are removed from the election), and we
select always a candiate that is approved by at least q of the votes remaining
when the candidate is selected whenever such candidate exists, the rule will
satisfy PJR. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 2. We say that a voting rule belongs to the PJR-Exact family
(this family of voting rules is characterized by the use of the exact quota as
the (maximum) amount of votes removed from the election at each iteration)
when the following conditions hold:
1. The voting rule consists of an iterative algorithm in which at each it-
eration one candidate is added to the set of winners W .
2. At each iteration fractions of the votes are removed from the election.
For each voter i we define f ji as the fraction of the vote of voter i that
has not been removed from the election after j candidates have been
added to the set of winners. For each voter i we define f 0i = 1. At all
time, it must be 0 ≤ f ji ≤ 1, for all i, j. For each voter i and for each
j = 0, . . . , k − 1, it must be f j+1i ≤ f
j
i .
If at certain iteration j the number of remaining (fractions of the) votes
that approve the selected candidate c is greater than q = n
k
, then only
q of such votes are removed from the election (that is,
∑
i:c∈Ai
(f ji −
f j−1i ) = q). If at certain iteration j the number of remaining (fractions
of the) votes that approve the selected candidate c is less than or equal
to q, then all such votes are removed from the election (that is, for all
i such that c ∈ Ai, it is f
j
i = 0).
For each voter i that does not approve the candidate c selected at iter-
ation j, it is f ji = f
j−1
i .
3. At each iteration j, if exists at least one not yet elected candidate c
such that it is approved by at least q (fractions of the) remaining votes,
no candidate that is approved by less than q votes can be selected.
Theorem 1. All the voting rules that belong to the PJR-Exact family satisfy
PJR.
Then, the next question is: can we find a subfamily of voting rules in
PJR-Exact that satisfy EJR? We address this question in the next section.
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3.2 Next ideas
First of all, lets analyze in detail what happens in the first three iterations
of phragme´n-STV for example 2.
Iteration 1 The first candidate selected is the most approved. Such can-
didate is c5, that is approved by 242 voters. For each voter that approves
c5 (that is, the voters that approve {c1, c2, c5} and the voters that approve
{c5, c7}) it is f
1
i = f
0
i
242−120
242
= 122
242
. For all the other voters it is f 1i = 1.
To analyze what has happened in this iteration, lets introduce first some
ideas. First of all, for each not yet elected candidate c, we can establish
an upper bound on the possible values of ℓ, for which an ℓ-cohesive group
of voters can exist such that all the members in the group approve c. Lets
call such bound the dissatisfaction level of such candidate. One possible way
(although a not accurate enough) of defining such bound is ⌊knc
n
⌋.
For instance, we can establish the following bounds: 2 = ⌊120+120
120
⌋ for c1
and c2, 2 = ⌊
120+122
120
⌋ for c5 and 1 = ⌊
122+52
120
⌋ for c7.
Then, for each voter i we can also establish an upper bound on the possible
values of ℓ, for which voter i can be a member of a ℓ-cohesive group of
voters. Lets call this again the dissatisfaction level of the voters. One possible
way (although again a not accurate enough) of defining such bound is the
maximum value of the dissatisfaction levels of the candidates in Ai. To
reach that bound would require that the maximum dissatisfaction level ℓ
of a candidate in Ai is reached by ℓ of such candidates and that all that
ℓ candidates are (mostly) approved by the same voters, so this is a rather
pessimistic bound.
Taking into account these ideas, at iteration 1 things seem to be going
well. Observe that for all the voters that approve {c1, c2, c5} and all the voters
that approve {c5, c7}, the dissatisfaction level is clearly less than or equal to
2 (because all of c1, c2, c5 and c7 have a dissatisfaction level smaller than
or equal to 2). The EJR axiom requires that certain voter in an ℓ-cohesive
group approves ℓ winners. If a voter i has a dissatisfaction level of x, we
can think that it would be desirable that for each candidate approved by i
that is added to the set of winners no more than 1
x
units of the vote of i are
removed from the election. This would allow that x candidates approved by
i could be added to the set of winners before the entire vote of i is exhausted.
This is the case of iteration 1, because we remove 120
242
from each voter that
aproves c5, which is less that
1
2
, and the dissatisfaction level of the voters
that approve c5 is at most 2.
Observe, however, that we can be more accurate in the computation of
the dissatisfaction levels. First of all, we observe that the dissatisfaction level
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of a candidate can decrease during the execution of a rule. Suppose that the
dissatisfaction level of certain candidate c is initially ℓ. Suppose that after
certain number of iterations some voters that approve c have already at least ℓ
of their approved candidates in the set of winners. In that situation we cannot
expect that such voters contribute with 1
ℓ
units of vote when candidate c is
elected, so we must take this into account when computing the dissatisfaction
levels.
An example of this is the situation of candidate c7 after iteration 1. Since
122 + 52 = 174 > 120 voters approve c7 we must expect that the initial
dissatisfaction level of candidate c7 must be 1. However, after candidate c5
is elected at iteration 1 the 122 voters that approve {c5, c7} already approve
one candidate in the set of winners. For such voters f 1i =
122
242
< 1
1
(here 1
1
is
the inverse of the initial dissatisfacton level of candidate c7). Se we can not
count any more on these voters to compute the dissatisfaction level of c7 (and
therefore the dissatisfaction level of c7 after iteration 1 must be ⌊
52
120
⌋ = 0).
We observe also that after iteration 1 the remaining (fractions of) votes that
approve c7 are 122
122
242
+ 52 ≃ 113, 5 < 120, so it seems difficult to guarantee
that c7 will be elected at a future iteration.
Observe also that the decrease of the dissatisfaction level of c7 does not
look dangerous with respect to our goal of satisfying EJR. In fact, the voters
that approve c7 constitute a 1-cohesive group of voters. For such voters the
requirements imposed by EJR are satisfied with the election of candidate c5
because the number of voters that do not approve at least one candidate
(that is, voters that approve only c7) is 52 which is less that 120.
We observe also that when computing the dissatisfaction level of the
voters we do not need to take care of the dissatisfaction levels of candidates
that have already being added to the set of winners. Suppose that for voter
i after j candidates have been added to the set of winners W , the maximum
dissatisfaction level of candidates in Ai ∩ W is ℓ. If |Ai ∩ W | ≥ ℓ, then
this voter satisfies the requirements imposed by EJR if she belongs to a ℓ-
cohesive group of voters. If |Ai ∩ W | < ℓ and the dissatisfaction levels of
all candidates in Ai \W are strictly smaller than ℓ, then this voter cannot
belong to a ℓ-cohesive group of voters1. In summary, in the computation of
the dissatisfaction level of each voter i we only need to take into account the
dissatisfaction levels of the candidates in Ai\W and the number of candidates
1It may happen that even if all the candidates in Ai \W have a dissatisfaction level
strictly smaller than ℓ some of them had initially a dissatisfaction level greater than or
equal to ℓ. It is then possible that voter i belongs to a ℓ-cohesive group of voters, but
in such case, other voters in the cohesive group must have at least ℓ of their approved
candidates in the set of winners, and thus the requirements imposed by EJR would be
also satisfied
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approved by voter i that have already being added to the set of winners (that
is, |Ai ∩W |).
The above discussion motivates the following definitions.
Definition 3. Consider a ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An) over a candidate
set C and a target committee size k, k ≤ |C|. Given a set of candidates
W , |W | ≤ k, we will represent the dissatisfaction level of a candidate c ∈
C \W with respect to the set of candidates W as ℓ(c,W ) and its value is the
highest non-negative integer such that ℓ(c,W ) = ⌊ k
n
|{i : c ∈ Ai ∧ |Ai ∩W | <
ℓ(c,W )}|⌋.
When certain rule is used to obtain the set of winners for a given election,
and the rule consists of an iterative algorithm in which at each iteration one
candidate is added to the set of winners, we will use the notation ℓj(c) to refer
to dissatisfaction level of a candidate c with respect to the first j (j = 0, . . . , k)
candidates selected by the rule. That is, for each j = 0, . . . , k, if Wj is the
set of the first j candidates added to the set of winners by the given rule
(W0 = ∅), and c ∈ C \Wj, then ℓj(c) = ℓ(c,Wj).
Definition 4. Consider a ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set
C and a target committee size k, k ≤ |C|. The set of winners W is computed
with certain rule that belongs to the PJR-Exact family. For j = 0, . . . , k− 1,
let Wj be the set of the first j candidates added by the rule to the set of
winners (W0 = ∅). For j = 0, . . . , k − 1, for each candidate c ∈ C \ Wj
and for each voter i such that c ∈ Ai, the dissatisfaction level ℓj(i, c) of
voter i if candidate c is added to the set of winners in the next iteration is
ℓj(i, c) = max
c′∈Ai\(Wj∪{c})
ℓj(c
′), and the minimum fraction of i’s vote that should
be kept for other candidates if candidate c is added to the set of winners in
the next iteration is gji (c), where
gji (c) =
{
0 if ℓj(i, c) ≤ |Ai ∩Wj |
ℓj(i,c)−|Ai∩Wj |−1
ℓj(i,c)
if ℓj(i, c) > |Ai ∩Wj|
For j = 0, . . . , k − 1, we say that a candidate c ∈ C \Wj is in a normal
state after j candidates have been added to the set of winners if the following
conditions hold:
1. For each voter i such that c ∈ Ai, if ℓj(i, c) > |Ai ∩Wj| then it has to
be f ji ≥
ℓj(i,c)−|Ai∩Wj |
ℓj(i,c)
, and
2.
∑
i:c∈Ai
(f ji − g
j
i (c)) ≥ q.
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Candidates in normal state are those candidates that can be safely added
to the set of winners. First of all, for each voter i such that i approves the
considered candidate c the dissatisfaction level of voter i is ℓj(i, c) and this
means that we wish that voter i will approve at least ℓj(i, c) winners at the
end of the election. We note that in the computation of ℓj(i, c) we excluded
candidate c because if c is added to the set of winners we would not need to
consider the value of ℓj(c) in the computation of the dissatisfaction level of
voter i. Then, the first condition states that for each voter i that approves c
either such voter is already satisfied (this means that the number of already
elected winners that the voter approves is at least ℓj(i, c)) or the voter has
enough fraction of vote left so as to be able to assign 1
ℓj(i,c)
to each of the
additional winners that such voter expects to approve in future. This is the
total number of winners that the voter wish to approve (ℓj(i, c)) minus the
number of already elected winners that the voter approves (|Ai ∩Wj|).
The second condition establishes that if candidate c is added to the set
of winners it will be possible to remove q votes from the voters that approve
c in such a way that each voter that needs to approve additional winnerss
could still assign 1
ℓj(i,c)
to each of such winners.
We observe that in example 2 candidate c5 is in normal state before iter-
ation 1. For the voters that approve {c1, c2, c5} we have ℓ0(i, c5) = ℓ0(c1) =
ℓ0(c2) = 2 and for the voters that approve {c5, c7} we have ℓ0(i, c5) =
ℓ0(c7) = 1. For the first condition, and for all voters that approve c5 we
have f 0i = 1 ≥
ℓ0(i,c5)−|Ai∩W0|
ℓ0(i,c5)
= ℓ0(i,c5)−0
ℓ0(i,c5)
= 1. For the second condition
we have
∑
i:c5∈Ai
(f 0i − g
0
i (c5)) = 120(1 −
1
2
) + 122(1 − 0) ≥ 120. How-
ever, candidate c7 is not in normal state because for candidate c7 we have∑
i:c7∈Ai
(f 0i − g
0
i (c7)) = 122(1−
1
2
) + 52(1− 0) = 113 < 120.
The following lemma relates the concept of dissatisfaction level with EJR.
Lemma 1. Consider a ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set C
and a target committee size k, k ≤ |C|. Suppose that for certain candidate set
W , |W | = k it holds that the dissatisfaction level of each candidate c ∈ C \W
is 0. Then W provides EJR.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction suppose that for certain ballot profile
A = (A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set C and certain target committee size
k, k ≤ |C|, for certain candidate set W , |W | = k it holds that for each
candidate c ∈ C \W it is ℓ(c,W ) = 0, but W does not provide EJR.
Then there exists a set of voters N∗ ⊆ N and a possitive integer ℓ such
that |N∗| ≥ ℓn
k
and |
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai| ≥ ℓ but |Ai ∩ W | < ℓ for each i ∈ N
∗.
Moreover, a candidate must exist such that it is approved by all the voters
in N∗ but she is not in W . Let c∗ be such candidate. Clearly, N∗ ⊆ {i : c∗ ∈
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Ai∧ |Ai∩W | < ℓ}, and therefore, ⌊
k
n
|{i : c∗ ∈ Ai∧ |Ai∩W | < ℓ}|⌋ ≥ ℓ. This
implies that ℓ(c∗,W ) ≥ ℓ > 0, a contradiction.
Lets see now what happens in the next two iterations.
Iteration 2 The second candidate selected is c8, that is approved by 241
of the remaining votes. For each voter that approves c8 (that is, the voters
that approve {c3, c4, c8} and the voters that approve {c8, c9}) it is f
2
i =
241−120
241
f 1i =
121
241
.
Candidate c8 is in normal state before iteration 2. For the voters that ap-
prove {c3, c4, c8} we have ℓ1(i, c8) = ℓ1(c3) = ℓ1(c4) = 2 and for the voters that
approve {c8, c9} we have ℓ1(i, c8) = ℓ1(c9) = 1. For the first condition, and
for all voters that approve c8 we have f
1
i = 1 ≥
ℓ1(i,c8)−|Ai∩W1|
ℓ1(i,c8)
= ℓ1(i,c8)−0
ℓ1(i,c8)
= 1.
For the second condition we have
∑
i:c8∈Ai
(f 1i −g
1
i (c8)) = 120(1−
1
2
)+121(1−
0) ≥ 120.
Things continue to look good.
Iteration 3 The third candidate selected is c6, that is approved by 190
of the remaining votes. For each voter that approves c6 (that is, the voters
that approve {c1, c2, c6} and the voters that approve {c3, c4, c6}) it is f
3
i =
190−120
190
f 2i =
70
190
.
Candidate c6 is not in normal state before iteration 3. For the voters that
approve {c1, c2, c6} we have ℓ2(i, c6) = ℓ2(c1) = ℓ2(c2) = 2 and for the voters
that approve {c3, c4, c6} we have ℓ2(i, c6) = ℓ2(c3) = ℓ2(c4) = 2. Candidate c6
is not in normal state because
∑
i:c6∈Ai
(f 2i −g
2
i (c6)) = 120(1−
1
2
)+70(1− 1
2
) =
95 < 120. Moreover, we observe that the election of candidate c6 causes a big
harm to candidates c1 and c2. Voters that approve c1 and c2 form a 2-cohesive
group of voters. After iteration 3, all such voters approve only one of the
candidates in the set of winners. This means that to satisfy EJR we need that
an additional candidate approved by such voters would have to be added to
the set of winners (this has to be one of c1 or c2). However, after iteration 3
the remaining votes that approve c1 and c2 are 120
122
242
+120 70
190
≃ 104, 7 < 120,
and therefore it seems difficult to guarantee that one of c1 or c2 will be added
to the set of winners (in fact they will never be added to the set of winners).
We observe that if the fraction of vote that was removed from the voters that
approve {c1, c2, c6} were less than or equal to
1
2
more than 120 voters that
approve c1 and c2 would remain in the election, and therefore we would be
in the safe side.
The situation that has happened in iteration 3 is captured by the following
definitions.
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Definition 5. Consider a ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set
C and a target committee size k, k ≤ |C|. The set of winners W is computed
with certain rule that belongs to the PJR-Exact family. For j = 0, . . . , k, let
Wj be the set of the first j candidates added by the rule to the set of winners
(W0 = ∅). For j = 0, . . . , k − 1, for each candidate c ∈ C \Wj and for each
voter i such that c ∈ Ai let ℓj(i, c) = max
c′∈Ai\(Wj∪{c})
ℓj(c
′).
For j = 0, . . . , k − 1, we say that a candidate c ∈ C \Wj is in a starving
state after j candidates have been added to the set of winners if for some
voter i such that c ∈ Ai it is ℓj(i, c) > |Ai ∩Wj | but f
j
i <
ℓj(i,c)−|Ai∩Wj |
ℓj(i,c)
.
For j = 0, . . . , k − 1, we say that a candidate c ∈ C \Wj is in a eager
state after j candidates have been added to the set of winners if it is not in
a starving state and
∑
i:c∈Ai
f ji ≥ q but
∑
i:c∈Ai
(f ji − g
j
i (c)) < q, where
gji (c) =
{
0 if ℓj(i, c) ≤ |Ai ∩Wj |
ℓj(i,c)−|Ai∩Wj |−1
ℓj(i,c)
if ℓj(i, c) > |Ai ∩Wj|
Finally, for j = 0, . . . , k − 1, we say that a candidate c ∈ C \Wj is in a
insufficiently supported state after j candidates have been added to the set of
winners if it is not in a starving state and
∑
i:c∈Ai
f ji < q.
Definition 6. Consider a ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set
C and a target committee size k, k ≤ |C|. The set of winners W is computed
with certain rule that belongs to the PJR-Exact family. For j = 0, . . . , k, let
Wj be the set of the first j candidates added by the rule to the set of winners
(W0 = ∅). For j = 0, . . . , k − 1, for each candidate c ∈ C \Wj and for each
voter i such that c ∈ Ai let ℓj(i, c) = max
c′∈Ai\(Wj∪{c})
ℓj(c
′).
For j = 1, . . . , k, we say that iteration j is normal if the following condi-
tions hold:
1. The candidate c that is added to the set of winners is in a normal state.
2. For each voter i such that c ∈ Ai and ℓj−1(i, c) > |Ai ∩Wj−1|, it must
be f ji ≥
ℓj−1(i,c)−|Ai∩Wj |
ℓj−1(i,c)
.
For j = 1, . . . , k, we say that iteration j is insufficiently supported if
the selected candidate is in an insufficiently supported state and we say that
iteration j is not normal if such iteration is neither a normal iteration nor
an insufficiently supported iteration.
According to these definitions, we observe that for example 2 candidate c6
was in an eager state before the execution of iteration 3 and that candidates
c1 and c2 are in a starving state after the execution of iteration 3.
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We observe that candidates that after certain iterarion are in an eager
state do not need to last in such state forever. For the election in example 2
suppose that in the first iteration we select candidate c5 but that we remove
all the 120 votes from the voters that approve {c5, c7}; then, in the second
iteration we add candidate c1 to the set of winners and we remove all the
120 votes that approve {c1, c2, c5}. Now candidate c6 is in a normal state.
As we have already discussed, the selection of a candidate that is in an
eager state at iteration 3 is closely related to the fact that the set of winners
outputted by phragme´n-STV for example 2 fails to provide EJR. To avoid this
situation we are going to follow a very drastic2 but simple approach: we are
going to avoid selecting candidates in an eager state as much as possible (and
we are going to see soon that we can do much to avoid selecting candidates
in an eager state).
Normal iterations have a number of nice properties that we are going to
discuss now.
Lemma 2. Consider a ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set
C and a target committee size k, k ≤ |C|. The set of winners W is computed
with certain rule that belongs to the PJR-Exact family. For j = 0, . . . , k, let
Wj be the set of the first j candidates added by the rule to the set of winners
(W0 = ∅). For j = 0, . . . , k, and for each voter i, let ℓj(i) = max
c∈Ai\Wj
ℓj(c).
Fix a value j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ k and suppose that the first j iterations of
the rule are all normal. Then for each voter i it holds that either |Ai∩Wj | ≥
ℓj(i) or f
j
i ≥
ℓj(i)−|Ai∩Wj |
ℓj(i)
.
Proof. For h = 0, . . . , k−1, for each candidate c ∈ C \Wh and for each voter
i such that c ∈ Ai let ℓh(i, c) = max
c′∈Ai\(Wh∪{c})
ℓh(c
′). Fix a voter i ∈ N . If
no candidate approved by voter i is added to the set of winners in the first
j iterations then the lemma trivially holds. Suppose that some candidates
approved by voter i have been added to the set of winners during the first
j iterations but |Ai ∩Wj | < ℓj(i). Let r be the last of the first j iterations
in which a candidate approved by voter i is added to the set of winners
and let cr be such candidate. Then, f
j
i = f
r
i . We have already seen that
the dissatisfaction levels of the voters are monotonically non-increasing, and
therefore, it is ℓj(i) ≤ ℓr−1(i, cr). Moreover, since iteration r is normal we
have that f ri ≥
ℓr−1(i,cr)−|Ai∩Wr |
ℓr−1(i,cr)
. We have
2And maybe antidemocratic.
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f ji = f
r
i ≥
ℓr−1(i, cr)− |Ai ∩Wr|
ℓr−1(i, cr)
=
ℓr−1(i, cr)− |Ai ∩Wj |
ℓr−1(i, cr)
≥
ℓj(i)− |Ai ∩Wj |
ℓj(i)
Corollary 1. Consider a ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set
C and a target committee size k, k ≤ |C|. The set of winners W is computed
with certain rule that belongs to the PJR-Exact family. For j = 0, . . . , k, let
Wj be the set of the first j candidates added by the rule to the set of winners
(W0 = ∅). Fix a value j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 and suppose that the first j
iterations of the rule are all normal. Then, after the first j iterations of the
rule no candidate in C \Wj can be in starving state.
Proof. For each voter i, let ℓj(i) = max
c∈Ai\Wj
ℓj(c). For each candidate c ∈
C \Wj and for each voter i such that c ∈ Ai, let ℓj(i, c) = max
c′∈Ai\Wj∪{c}
ℓj(c
′).
Clearly, for each candidate c ∈ C \Wj and for each voter i such that c ∈ Ai,
it is ℓj(i) ≥ ℓj(i, c). Moreover, by lemma 2 it is either |Ai ∩Wj | ≥ ℓj(i) or
f ji ≥
ℓj(i)−|Ai∩Wj |
ℓj(i)
. Therefore, if for certain voter i it is ℓj(i, c) > |Ai ∩Wj|,
then f ji ≥
ℓj(i)−|Ai∩Wj |
ℓj(i)
≥ ℓj(i,c)−|Ai∩Wj |
ℓj(i,c)
.
Lemma 3. Consider a ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set
C and a target committee size k, k ≤ |C|. The set of winners W is computed
with certain rule that belongs to the PJR-Exact family. For j = 0, . . . , k, let
Wj be the set of the first j candidates added by the rule to the set of winners
(W0 = ∅). Fix a value j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ k and suppose that the first j
iterations of the rule are all normal. Then, for each candidate c ∈ C \Wj
such that ℓj(c) ≥ 1, it holds that
∑
i:c∈Ai∧|Ai∩Wj |<ℓj(c)
(f ji −
ℓj (c)−|Ai∩Wj |−1
ℓj(c)
) ≥ q.
Proof. For each voter i, let ℓj(i) = max
c′∈Ai\Wj
ℓj(c
′). Clearly, for each voter
i such that c ∈ Ai it is ℓj(i) ≥ ℓj(c). By lemma 2 for each voter i such
that |Ai ∩ Wj | < ℓj(i) it is f
j
i ≥
ℓj(i)−|Ai∩Wj |
ℓj(i)
. Definition 3 implies that
|{i : c ∈ Ai ∧ |Ai ∩Wj | < ℓj(c)}| ≥ ℓj(c)
n
k
. We have
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∑
i:c∈Ai∧|Ai∩Wj |<ℓj(c)
f ji −
ℓj(c)− |Ai ∩Wj | − 1
ℓj(c)
)
≥
∑
i:c∈Ai∧|Ai∩Wj |<ℓj(c)
(
ℓj(i)− |Ai ∩Wj |
ℓj(i)
−
ℓj(c)− |Ai ∩Wj | − 1
ℓj(c)
)
≥
∑
i:c∈Ai∧|Ai∩Wj |<ℓj(c)
(
ℓj(c)− |Ai ∩Wj |
ℓj(c)
−
ℓj(c)− |Ai ∩Wj| − 1
ℓj(c)
)
=
∑
i:c∈Ai∧|Ai∩Wj |<ℓj(c)
1
ℓj(c)
≥ ℓj(c)
n
k
1
ℓj(c)
= q
Here comes the good news: it is always possible to avoid adding candi-
dates in an eager state to the set of winners.
Theorem 2. Consider a ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set
C and a target committee size k, k ≤ |C|. The set of winners W is computed
with certain rule that belongs to the PJR-Exact family. For j = 0, . . . , k, let
Wj be the set of the first j candidates added by the rule to the set of winners
(W0 = ∅). Fix a value j such that 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 and suppose that the first
j iterations of the rule are all normal (j = 0 means that no iteration has
been executed yet). Suppose that after the first j iterations certain candidate
c1 ∈ C\Wj is in an eager state. Then, there exists other candidate c2 ∈ C\Wj
that is in a normal state.
Proof. For each candidate c ∈ C \Wj and for each voter i such that c ∈ Ai
let ℓj(i, c) = max
c′∈Ai\(Wj∪{c})
ℓj(c
′). Also, for each candidate c ∈ C \Wj and each
voter i such that c ∈ Ai let g
j
i (c) be
gji (c) =
{
0 if ℓj(i, c) ≤ |Ai ∩Wj|
ℓj(i,c)−|Ai∩Wj |−1
ℓj(i,c)
if ℓj(i, c) > |Ai ∩Wj |
First of all, we observe that by lemma 2 all the candidates c in C \Wj
satisfy the first condition required to be in normal state, that is, for each
voter i such that c ∈ Ai if ℓj(i, c) > |Ai ∩Wj | it has to be f
j
i ≥
ℓj(i,c)−|Ai∩Wj |
ℓj(i,c)
.
Now, if candidate c1 is in an eager state, this means that
∑
i:c1∈Ai
f ji ≥ q
but
∑
i:c1∈Ai
(f ji − g
j
i (c1)) < q. Suppose first that ℓj(c1) = 0. Since for each
i such that c1 ∈ Ai and ℓj(i, c1) = 0 it is g
j
i (c1) = 0, there should be certain
voter i1 such that c1 ∈ Ai1 and ℓj(i1, c1) > 0 (otherwise
∑
i:c1∈Ai
(f ji−g
j
i (c1)) =
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∑
i:c1∈Ai
f ji ≥ q, and c1 would be in a normal state). If ℓj(i1, c1) > 0 this
means that there must exist a candidate c3 in C \Wj such that c3 ∈ Ai1 and
ℓj(c3) > 0.
If c3 is in a normal state then the theorem holds. By lemma 3 it has to be∑
i:c3∈Ai∧|Ai∩Wj |<ℓj(c3)
(f ji −
ℓj(c3)−|Ai∩Wj |−1
ℓj(c3)
) ≥ q and therefore
∑
i:c3∈Ai
f ji ≥ q.
Thus, c3 cannot be in an insufficiently supported state. By corollary 1 c3
cannot be in a starving state. Therefore, if c3 is not in a normal state
then c3 has to be in an eager state. If c3 is in an eager state then it is∑
i:c3∈Ai
(f ji −g
j
i (c3)) < q. Combining this with lemma 3 we have
∑
i:c3∈Ai
(f ji −
gji (c3))−
∑
i:c3∈Ai∧|Ai∩Wj |<ℓj(c3)
(f ji −
ℓj(c3)−|Ai∩Wj |−1
ℓj(c3)
) < 0. But
∑
i:c3∈Ai
(f ji − g
j
i (c3))−
∑
i:c3∈Ai∧|Ai∩Wj |<ℓj(c3)
(f ji −
ℓj(c3)− |Ai ∩Wj | − 1
ℓj(c3)
)
≥
∑
i:c3∈Ai∧|Ai∩Wj |<ℓj(c3)
(f ji − g
j
i (c3))− (f
j
i −
ℓj(c3)− |Ai ∩Wj | − 1
ℓj(c3)
)
=
∑
i:c3∈Ai∧|Ai∩Wj |<ℓj(c3)
(
ℓj(c3)− |Ai ∩Wj | − 1
ℓj(c3)
− gji (c3))
This implies that for some voter i3 such that c3 ∈ Ai3 and |Ai3 ∩Wj | <
ℓj(c3) it has to be
ℓj(c3)−|Ai3∩Wj |−1
ℓj(c3)
−gji3(c3) < 0. Since |Ai3∩Wj | < ℓj(c3), it is
ℓj(c3)−|Ai3∩Wj |−1
ℓj(c3)
≥ 0. Therefore, gji3(c3) > 0. It follows that ℓj(i3, c3) > |Ai3 ∩
Wj | and that g
j
i3
(c3) =
ℓj(i3,c3)−|Ai3∩Wj |−1
ℓj(i3,c3)
. But
ℓj(c3)−|Ai3∩Wj |−1
ℓj(c3)
− gji3(c3) =
ℓj(c3)−|Ai3∩Wj |−1
ℓj(c3)
−
ℓj(i3,c3)−|Ai3∩Wj |−1
ℓj(i3,c3)
< 0 implies that ℓj(i3, c3) > ℓj(c3). Then,
a candidate c4 ∈ C \Wj must exist such that c4 ∈ Ai3 and ℓj(c4) > ℓj(c3).
We can then repeat for candidate c4 and successively the reasoning we
did for c3. At each step either the candidate that we find is in normal state or
there exists another candidate in C \Wj with a strictly higher dissatisfaction
level. We note, however, that dissatisfaction levels are bounded by k, and
therefore, at some point we have to find a candidate c2 that is in a normal
state.
The proof when ℓj(c1) > 0 is similar but we can start reasoning directly
as we did with candidate c3.
We have now identified our strategy for the EJR-Exact family of voting
rules: we will run normal iterations as much as possible. If at certain point
no candidate is available that is in a normal state, this means that all the
unelected candidates have to be in an insufficiently supported state. We
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then simply run enough insufficiently supported iterations to complete the
required number of candidates.
4 The EJR-Exact family of voting rules
The EJR-Exact family of voting rules is defined in algorithms 2 and 3.
Algorithm 2 The EJR-Exact family (part 1)
Given the algorithms Alg1, Alg2 and Alg3 that characterize each rule
Input: an approval-based multi-winner election (N,C,A, k)
Output: the set of winners W
1: W ← ∅
2: foreach c ∈ C do
3: ℓ0(c)← ⌊
knc
n
⌋
4: end foreach
5: for j = 1 to k do
6: Cst1 ← ∅
7: foreach c ∈ C \W do
8: xc ← 0
9: foreach i : c ∈ Ai do
10: ℓj−1(i, c)← max
c′∈Ai\(W∪{c})
ℓj−1(c
′)
11: if ℓj−1(i, c) > |Ai ∩W |+ 1 then
12: xc ← xc + f
j−1
i −
ℓj−1(i,c)−(|Ai∩W |+1)
ℓj−1(i,c)
13: else
14: xc ← xc + f
j−1
i
15: end if
16: end foreach
17: if xc ≥ q then
18: Cst1 ← Cst1 ∪ {c}
19: end if
20: end foreach
Each instance of EJR-Exact family is characterized by 3 algorithms: Alg1,
Alg2 and Alg3. At each normal iteration first Alg1 is executed to select which
of the candidates in a normal state will be added to the set of winners. Then
Alg2 is executed to remove q votes from the voters that approve the selected
candidate in such a way that the rules that must be followed in a normal
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iteration are respected. Finally Alg3 is executed to select the candidates that
will be added to the set of winners in insufficiently supported iterations.
Algorithm 3 The EJR-Exact family (part 2)
21: if Cst1 6= ∅ then
22: ⊲ Stage 1: normal iteration
23: Execute Alg1 to select a candidate w from Cst1
24: foreach i ∈ N \Nw do
25: f ji ← f
j−1
i
26: end foreach
27: Execute Alg2 to remove q votes from the voters that approve w
Ensure: f ji ≥
ℓj−1(i,w)−|Ai∩W |−1
ℓj−1(i,w)
for each voter i such that w ∈ Ai and
ℓj−1(i, w) > |Ai ∩W |
28: W ←W ∪ {w}
29: foreach c ∈ C \W do
30: ℓj(c)← ℓj−1(c)
31: while ℓj(c) > ⌊
k
n
|{i : c ∈ Ai ∧ |Ai ∩W | < ℓj(c)}|⌋ do
32: ℓj(c)← ℓj(c)− 1
33: end while
34: end foreach
35: else
36: break
37: end if
38: end for
39: if |W | < k then
40: ⊲ Stage 2: insufficiently supported iterations
41: j ← |W |
42: Execute Alg3 to add k − j candidates from C \W to W
43: end if
44: return W
The execution of a rule in the EJR-Exact family is as follows. First, for
each candidate c ∈ C, its initial dissatisfaction level ℓ0(c) is computed in
lines 2–4 of algorithm 2. Then, a loop is executed (at most) k times to add
candidates to the set of winners. At each iteration j of the loop, first for
each candidate c ∈ C \W we check if such candidate is in a normal state.
The candidates that are in a normal state are stored in Cst1. This is done in
lines 6–20 of algorithm 2.
If Cst1 is not empty then we run a normal iteration (lines 22–34 of algo-
rithm 3). Algorithm Alg1 is executed to select one candidate w from Cst1
that will be added to the set of winners and then algorithm Alg2 is executed
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to remove q votes from the voters that approve candidate w. This has to
be done in such a way that the rules established for normal iterations are
respected (see definition 6). Finally, we update the dissatisfaction levels of
the candidates.
If Cst1 is empty then we exit the loop and, if necessary, run enough
insufficiently supported iterations to completeW (lines 40–42 of algorithm 3).
Theorem 3. All the voting rules in the EJR-Exact family satisfy EJR.
Proof. It is very easy to prove that all the rules in the EJR-Exact family
satisfy EJR. For the sake of contradiction suppose that for certain ballot
profile A = (A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set C and certain target committee
size k, k ≤ |C|, the set of winners W that certain rule that belongs to
the EJR-Exact family outputs does not provide EJR. Then there exists a
set of voters N∗ ⊆ N and a possitive integer ℓ such that |N∗| ≥ ℓn
k
and
|
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai| ≥ ℓ but |Ai ∩W | < ℓ for each i ∈ N
∗. Moreover, a candidate
must exist such that candidate is approved by all the voters in N∗ but she is
not in the set of winners. Let c be such candidate. Observe that according
to definition 3, for each iteration j it is ℓj(c) ≥ ℓ.
Suppose first that for that election and rule all the iterations are normal.
Then, since at each iteration we remove q = n
k
votes at the end of the election
we have removed all the votes from the election. However, lemma 2 says that
for each voter i in N∗ it must be fki ≥
ℓk(i)−|Ai∩W |
ℓk(i)
> 0, a contradiction.
Suppose then that for that election and rule we have some insufficiently
supported iterations and let j be the first insufficiently supported iteration
and Wj−1 be the set of the first j − 1 candidates that have been added to
the set of winners. We have seen that when we ran the first insufficiently
supported iteration all the candidates are in an insufficiently supported state,
that is, for each c′ ∈ C \Wj−1 it is
∑
i:c′∈Ai
f j−1i < q. However, lemma 3
says that for candidate c it is
∑
i:c∈Ai∧|Ai∩Wj |<ℓj(c)
(f ji −
ℓj(c)−|Ai∩Wj |−1
ℓj(c)
) ≥ q
and therefore it is also
∑
i:c∈Ai
f j−1i ≥ q which is again a contradiction.
We establish now bounds in computational complexity of the instances of
the EJR-Exact family in terms of the number of arithmetic operations. We
note that to take into account the size of the operands implies to establish
bounds on the number of bits required to represent each f ji . While this
cannot be done in general for all the instances of the EJR-Exact family, it
can be easily done for particular instaces.
Theorem 4. Suppose that for certain instance of EJR-Exact the number
of arithmetic operations required to execute Alg1, Alg2 and Alg3 is bounded,
respectively, by O(o1), O(o2) and O(o3) (depending on the particular instance,
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such bounds can depend on n, m, k, and other factors). Then, the number
of arithmetic operations required to execute such instance in the worst case
is bounded by O(nm2k + k(o1 + o2) + o3).
Proof. It is enough to review the cost of each part of the algorithm. We
assume that the profile is stored in a table with a row per voter and a
column per candidate. Each cell of the table is a bit that is set to 1 if the
corresponding voter approves the corresponding candidate. We also assume
that the value of |Ai ∩W | for each voter i is stored in an array of n counters
(one for each voter). Initially, the value of all the counters is set to zero.
Each time that a candidate w is added to the set of winners the counters
corresponding to the voters that approve w are incremented. This can be
done in O(n).
The initial dissatisfaction levels computed in lines 2–4 of algorithm 2
requires to compute nc (this can be done in O(n)) for each candidate, so the
total cost of computing the initial dissatisfaction levels is O(nm).
Then we ran at most k times a loop in which the following tasks are done:
1. First, for each candidate c, we have to check if such candidate is in
normal state (lines 7–20 of algorithm 2). To do that, for each voter i
that approves the candidate under consideration we have to compute
ℓj−1(i, c). This depends on the number of candidates approved by voter
i, and therefore, it can be done in O(m) operations. In summary,
lines 7–20 of algorithm 2 can be executed in O(nm2).
2. In line 23 of algorithm 3 a candidate in normal state is selected in
O(o1).
3. In line 27 of algorithm 3 q votes are removed from the election in O(o2).
4. In line 28 of algorithm 3 a candidate w is added to the set of winners.
As we explained before, also the counters that store the value of |Ai∩W |
for the voters that approve w are incremented. This can be done in
O(n).
5. In lines 29–34 of algorithm 3 the dissatisfaction levels are updated for
each candidate. The while loop in lines 31–33 is executed at most
k times, because the dissatisfaction levels are bounded by k. Each
time that we execute such while loop we need to compute |{i : c ∈
Ai ∧ |Ai ∩W | < ℓj(c)}|. This can be done in O(n) because we assume
that the values of |Ai ∩ W | and ℓj(c) have already been computed
and stored in memory. Therefore, the total computational cost of the
execution of lines 29–34 is bounded by O(nmk).
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Finally, the cost of executing line 42 of algorithm 3 is bounded by O(o3).
Combining all these data we obtain a worst case bound of O(nm2k+nmk2+
k(o1 + o2) + o3).
It is however possible to establish a better bound for the cost of the
computation of the dissatisfaction levels. As we have already seen, the initial
dissatisfaction level of each candidate is bounded by k. Based on this we have
established that each time that the while loop in lines 31–33 of algorithm 3 is
reached, such loop is executed at most k times. This is because each time we
enter such loop the dissatisfaction level of the candidate under consideration
is decremented and the dissatisfaction levels cannot fall below 0.
However, a similar reasoning allows us to conclude that for each candidate
the while loop in lines 31–33 of algorithm 3 can be entered at most k times
during the whole execution of an EJR-Exact rule. To see why we note that
the dissatisfaction level of a candidate is never incremented, its initial value
is at most k, its value cannot fall below 0 and each time that the while loop in
lines 31–33 of algorithm 3 is entered the dissatisfaction level of the candidate
under consideration is decremented by one unit.
We have to be careful here. The condition in line 31 of algorithm 3 is
checked each time that the loop is reached. Therefore, for each candidate
such condition is checked at most 2k times (once for each iteration of the
outer loop from line 5 of algorithm 2 to line 38 of algorithm 3 plus at most
k additional times when the condition holds). The cost of the evaluation
of the condition in line 31 of algorithm 3 is O(n). The body of the while
loop (line 32 of algorithm 3) is executed in constant time at most k times
for each candidate. Therefore, the total cost of updating the dissatisfaction
levels of the candidates during an execution of an EJR-Exact rule is at most
O(2nmk+mk) = O(nmk) and the total cost of an execution of an EJR-Exact
rule is at most O(nm2k + k(o1 + o2) + o3).
A very natural instance of the EJR-Exact family is EJR-LR-Even, defined
in algorithms 4, 5 and 6.
Example 3. The set of winners produced by EJR-LR-Even for the election
shown in example 2 is (in this order) c5, c8, c1 or c2, c3 or c4, c10, . . . , c21, c6,
and c9.
We illustrate the operation of EJR-LR-Even with the first iteration for
the election shown in example 2. The selected candidate is c5. We have
already seen that this candidate is initially in a normal state. xc5 stores the
amount of vote that can be removed from the election while keeping 1
ℓj−1(i,c5)
for additional candidates when necessary, and its value is 120(1− 1
2
)+122 =
182.
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Algorithm 4 EJR-LR-Even (part 1)
Input: an approval-based multi-winner election (N,C,A, k)
Output: the set of winners W
1: W ← ∅
2: foreach c ∈ C do
3: ℓ0(c)← ⌊
knc
n
⌋
4: end foreach
5: for j = 1 to k do
6: Cst1 ← ∅
7: foreach c ∈ C \W do
8: sjc ←
∑
i:c∈Ai
f j−1i
9: xc ← 0
10: foreach i : c ∈ Ai do
11: ℓj−1(i, c)← max
c′∈Ai\(W∪{c})
ℓj−1(c
′)
12: if ℓj−1(i, c) > |Ai ∩W |+ 1 then
13: xc ← xc + f
j−1
i −
ℓj−1(i,c)−(|Ai∩W |+1)
ℓj−1(i,c)
14: else
15: xc ← xc + f
j−1
i
16: end if
17: end foreach
18: if xc ≥ q then
19: Cst1 ← Cst1 ∪ {c}
20: end if
21: end foreach
An important difference between phargme´n-STV and EJR-LR-Even is
that in EJR-LR-Even we only scale down the fractions of votes that are con-
tained in xc5, and therefore the fractions of vote that remain in the election
after iteration 1 are as follows: f 1i = f
0
i −
q
xc5
(f 0i −
ℓ0(i,c5)−(|Ai∩W |+1)
ℓ0(i,c5)
) =
1 − 120
182
(1 − 2−(0+1)
2
) = 122
182
for the voters that approve {c1, c2, c4}, and f
1
i =
f 0i −
q
xc5
f 0i = 1−
120
182
1 = 62
182
for the voters that approve {c5, c7}.
Lemma 4. The number of arithmetic operations required to compute EJR-
LR-Even in the worst case is bounded by O(nm2k).
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Algorithm 5 EJR-LR-Even (part 2)
22: if Cst1 6= ∅ then
23: w ← argmax
c∈Cst1
sjc ⊲ Stage 1: normal iteration
24: foreach i ∈ N \Nw do
25: f ji ← f
j−1
i
26: end foreach
27: foreach i ∈ Nw do
28: if ℓj−1(i, c) > |Ai ∩W |+ 1 then
29: f ji ← f
j−1
i −
q
xw
(f j−1i −
ℓj−1(i,c)−(|Ai∩W |+1)
ℓj−1(i,c)
)
30: else
31: f ji ← f
j−1
i −
q
xw
f j−1i
32: end if
33: end foreach
34: W ←W ∪ {w}
35: foreach c ∈ C \W do
36: ℓj(c)← ℓj−1(c)
37: while ℓj(c) > ⌊
k
n
|{i : c ∈ Ai ∧ |Ai ∩W | < ℓj(c)}|⌋ do
38: ℓj(c)← ℓj(c)− 1
39: end while
40: end foreach
41: else
42: break
43: end if
44: end for
5 Some interesting instances of EJR-Exact
The results that we have obtained in the previous section are quite surprising
because before only the PAV rule was known to satisfy EJR. In contrast, we
can define as many rules as we want by choosing what we do in Alg1, Alg2
and Alg3. In this section we discuss some interesting alternatives. This
section is organized in two parts. First we discuss possible alternatives for
Alg1 and Alg2 and then we consider alternatives for Alg3.
5.1 Alternatives for Alg1 and Alg2
5.1.1 Simple EJR or SEJR
Suppose that we want to compute a committee that provides EJR for certain
ballot profile, candidate set and target committee size. Suppose that we
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Algorithm 6 EJR-LR-Even (part 3)
45: if |W | < k then
46: for j = |W |+1 to k do ⊲ Stage 2: insufficiently supported iterations
47: foreach c ∈ C \W do
48: sjc ←
∑
i:c∈Ai
f j−1i
49: end foreach
50: w ← argmax
c∈C\W
sjc
51: W ←W ∪ {w}
52: foreach i ∈ N \Nw do
53: f ji ← f
j−1
i
54: end foreach
55: foreach i ∈ Nw do
56: f ji ← 0
57: end foreach
58: end for
59: end if
60: return W
run some normal iterations to add some candidates to the set of winners.
After such normal iterations we find that certain candidate has the maximum
dissatisfaction level and that such dissatisfaction level is greater than or equal
to 1. Then, corollary 1 says that such candidate cannot be in a starving state,
lemma 3 says that she cannot be in an inssuficiently supported state and
theorem 2 says that she cannot be in an eager state. Thus, she is in a normal
state. Observe that we have not needed to look to the votes that remain in
the election. That is, if we choose at each iteration the candidate with the
highest dissatisfaction level (when ties happen we can choose any of the tied
candidates) we know that there exists a way to run normal iterations. Thus,
we do not need to compute the fractions of votes that remain in the election.
If at certain point we find that all the candidates that have not already
been added to the set of winners have a dissatisfaction level equal to 0,
it is possible that some of them are in a normal state and others are in
an insufficiently supported state. However, lemma 1 ensures that in that
situation the set of winners will provide EJR and therefore we do not need
to worry about this.
Algorithm 7 describes the subfamily of voting rules that operate under
these ideas. We refer to this subfamily as Simple EJR (SEJR) because this
is the simplest way that we know to compute committees that provide EJR.
Example 4. We consider again the election described in example 2. Sup-
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Algorithm 7 The SEJR subfamily
Given the algorithm Alg3 that characterize each rule
Input: an approval-based multi-winner election (N,C,A, k)
Output: the set of winners W
1: W ← ∅
2: j ← 0
3: foreach c ∈ C do
4: ℓ0(c)← ⌊
knc
n
⌋
5: end foreach
6: mℓ ← maxc∈C\W ℓ0(c)
7: while j < k and mℓ > 0 do
8: w ← argmax
c∈C\W
ℓj(c)
9: W ←W ∪ {w}
10: j ← j + 1
11: foreach c ∈ C \W do
12: ℓj(c) ← ℓj−1(c)
13: while ℓj(c) > ⌊
k
n
|{i : c ∈ Ai ∧ |Ai ∩W | < ℓj(c)}|⌋ do
14: ℓj(c)← ℓj(c)− 1
15: end while
16: end foreach
17: mℓ ← maxc∈C\W ℓj(c)
18: end while
19: if |W | < k then
20: j ← |W |
21: Execute Alg3 to add k − j candidates from C \W to W
22: end if
23: return W
pose that we compute the first winners using SEJR (that is, lines 1–18 of
algorithm 7). Suppose that we break ties first selecting the most approved
candidates and in the second place by lexicographic order. The initial dis-
satisfaction levels of the candidates is: 2 for c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, and c8; 1 for
c6, c7, and c9 and 0 for c10, . . . , c21. Therefore, we have to choose first one
of c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, or c8. It suffices to use the first tie-breaking rule to select
candidate c5. Then, the dissatisfaction level of candidate c7 falls to 0 and
the dissatisfaction levels of the other candidates do not change. Therefore,
in the second iteration we have to choose one of c1, c2, c3, c4, or c8. It suffices
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again to use the first tie-breaking rule to select candidate c8. The dissatisfac-
tion level of candidate c9 falls to 0 and the dissatisfaction levels of the other
candidates do not change. Thus, in the third iteration we have to choose
one of c1, c2, c3, or c4. All these candidates are approved by 240 votes and
therefore we need to make use of the second tie-breaking rule to select c1. The
dissatisfaction levels of c2 and c6 fall to 0. Finally, in the fourth iteration c3
is selected, and the dissatisfaction level of c4 falls to 0. All the candidates in
C \W have now a dissatisfaction level of 0, and therefore we exit the SEJR
loop. We may choose freely any 14 of the remaining candidates and the set
of winners will always provide EJR.
Lemma 5. Suppose that for certain instance of SEJR the number of arith-
metic operations required to execute Alg3 is bounded, by O(o3). Then, such
instance can be computed in O(nmk + o3).
Proof. We have seen at the end of the proof of theorem 4 that the total cost
of updating the dissatisfaction levels of the candidates during an execution
of an EJR-Exact rule is at most O(nmk). It follows immediately that the
cost of the execution of an instance of SEJR is bounded by O(nmk + o3).
We note that since in SEJR we only make use of integer arithmetic it
is reasonable to assume that arithmetic operations can be done in constant
time.
Corollary 2. For any ballot profile, candidate set and target committee size,
it is possible to compute a set of winners that provides EJR in O(nmk).
5.1.2 Minimizing Wasted Votes
It seems reasonable to desire that Alg2 removes votes in such a way that
it tries to minimize wasted votes. Suppose that for a given election after
running j normal iterations set of winners is Wj. The next iteration is also
normal and candidate w is selected to be added to the set of winners. Now,
we have to remove q of the votes that approve w from the election. Under the
idea of trying to minimize the number of wasted votes we should probably
first remove the votes from voters that have all their approved candidates in
the set of winners (that is, if for a voter i that approves w it is Ai ⊆ Wj∪{w},
then the vote of this voter should be one of the first removed in the election.
In the second place, we believe that we should remove the votes of voters
that are already satisfied (we say that a voter i is satisfied if |Ai ∩ (Wj ∪
{w})| ≥ ℓj(i, w)), because for these voters there is no need to add any other
of their approved candidates to get a set of winners that provides EJR.
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5.2 Alternatives for Alg3: EJR-Exact rules as appor-
tionment methods
Brill et al. [5] presents the following analogy between multi-winner elections
and apportionment problems: “Any apportionment problem can be seen as
a very simple approval voting instance: all voters approve all the candidates
from their chosen party, and only those.”. Such analogy can be used as a
way to classify multi-winner voting rules according to which party-list pro-
portional representation system they reduce.
Basically, the idea is to map any party-list election to an approval-based
multi-winner election. For each list in the original party-list election k can-
didates (k is the number of seats that must be allocated) are created. Then,
if list A received nA votes in the original party-list election, also nA vot-
ers approve only all the candidates created for list A in the approval-based
multi-winner election. For additional details we refer to [5].
The party-list proportional representation system to which a particular
instance of EJR-Exact reduces mainly depends on the algorithm chosen for
Alg3. In particular, EJR-LR-Even reduces to largest remainders (and hence
the LR in its name). In fact, any rule in the EJR-Exact family that uses the
same algorithm as EJR-LR-Even for Alg3 reduces to largest remainders.
Largest remainders assigns seats to each list in two steps: first, as many
seats as its lower quota; secondly, it assigns the last seats to the lists with
largest remainders after subtracting to each list total vote as many quotas
as such list has received. In the equivalent multi-winner election the first
step is equivalent to normal iterations for any instance of EJR-Exact. Then,
EJR-LR-Even in the insufficiently supported iterations assingns seats to the
candidates with higher remaining approval votes; this is equivalent to the
second step of largest remainders.
Interestingly, there are also rules in EJR-Exact that reduce to D’Hondt.
Since D’Hondt satisfies also lower quota, running normal iterations until there
are no candidates left in normal state and then using any approval-based
iterative rule such that their iterations are equivalent to D’Hondt iterations
in the apportionment scenario, like ODH [9], seq-phragme´n [6, 4] or RAV
(surveyed by Kilgour in [7]) for Alg3 will produce an instance that reduce to
D’Hondt. Due to its simplicity, we will use RAV to illustrate the idea.
Definition 7. Reweighted Approval Voting (RAV) RAV is a multi-
round rule that in each round selects a candidate and then reweights the
approvals for the subsequent rounds. Specifically, it starts by setting W =
∅. Then in round j, j = 1, . . . , k, it computes the approval-weight of each
candidate c as:
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∑
i:c∈Ai
1
1 + |W ∩Ai|
,
At each iteration, the candidate with largest approval weight is added to
the set of winners.
Example 5. We can consider using SEJR for the initial iterations and then
running RAV. We refer to this as SEJR-RAV. We use again example 2 to
illustrate how SEJR-RAV works. We first run SEJR as described in exam-
ple 4 and get W = {c1, c3, c5, c8}. In the first RAV iteration the candidate
with largest approval weight is c9. Its approval weight is 121
1
1+|W∩{c8,c9}|
+
65 1
1+|W∩{c9}|
= 125, 5. The remaining candidates added to the set of winners
are c7 and c10, . . . , c21.
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